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NOTES
INTERSTATE COMPACTS-STATE CONSTITUIONS 'AS
LIMITATIONS ON STATES' POWER TO RATIFY
FEDERALLY APPROVED COMPACTS
The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact,' recently ratified by'
the states of that region,2 is a notable departure from the older means of coping
with the political and legal aspects of interstate pollution problems. Since inter-
state water controversies involve a political admixture of states' rights and
federal power, none of the legal means adopted to solve them have been en-
tirely satisfactory. In the pollution field the Federal Government has acted
primarily in an advisory capacity. 3 And Congress has done very little under
.the commerce power to regulate even such navigable waters as the Ohio and
Mississippi rivers.4  Traditionally, cumbersome litigation by one state against
another has been frequently resorted to in settling disputes.'
The Compact provides for the creation of a Commission, composed of
three commissioners from each of the signatory states and three from the
United States,' which is to make rules and enforce orders for the prevention
1. 54 STAT. 752 (1936). Several compacts of a similar nature have recently been
approved by Congress. Tri-State, Compact (Conn., N.J., and N.Y.) 49 STAT. 932 (1935) ;
Red River of the North Compact (Minn., N. Dak., and S. Dak.) 52 STAT. 150 (1938) ;
Potomac River Compact (D.C., Md., Pa., Va., and W. Va.) 54 STAT. 748 (1940) ; New
England Interstate Water Pollution Compact (Conn., Mass., N.Y., R.I., and Vt.) 61
STAT. 682 (1947).
2. W. VA. AcTs 1939, c. 38, § 1; IND. Acts 1939, c. 35, .§ 1; ILL. LAWS 1939, § 1, p.
310; Ky. Acts 1940, c. 150, § 1; N.Y. LAws 1939, c. 776, § 1; OHio LAWS 1939, § 14881,
§ 1; PA. LAWs 1945, No. 50, § 1; VA. AcTs 1948, c. 117, § 1. Though Tennessee took part
in the original negotiations and has the permission of Congress and of the other states
to become a party, it has failed to do so.
3. Enacting the Water Pollution Control Act in 1948, Congress said: "... [It is]
the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of the States in controlling water pollution, to support and aid technical research,
to devise and perfect methods of treatment of industrial wastes . . . and to provide
Federal technical services to State and interstate agencies and to municipalities . . ."
62 STAT. 1155 (1948), 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. 1950). Responsibility for administration
rests with the Surgeon General, who must encourage cooperative state action, enactment
of uniform state laws, and compacts between states. Id. at § 466a. After fulfilling certain
requirements, the Surgeon General may request the Attorney General to initiate suit to
secure abatement of pollution causing harm in a state other than that in which the
discharge originates. But the Act makes no provision for enforcement action if consent
is not forthcoming from the water-pollution agency of the state where the pollution
originates. Id. at § 466a (d). For a more complete discussion of the Act, see Pollution
Control, The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, 3 WATER
RESOURCEs LAW 388 (1950).
4. Legislation regulating the use of navigable waters as depositaries of refuse has
been confined to preventing impediments to navigation. As the statute applies to refuse
"other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state," it does not prohibit pollution as it is commonly understood. 24 STAT. 329 (1886),
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1946).
5. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1928); New Jersey v. New*York, 265 U.S.
296 (1920) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 241 (1900). See also Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1944); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
6. The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Art. IV, 54 STAT. 752 (1936).
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of pollution by municipalities, corporations, and individuals. 7 The orders of
the Commission in particular instances can be enforced in the state or federal
courts ;' but no action can be taken against n offender in any state without
the approval of the commissioners representing that state.9 Each state is to
make periodic appropriations to defray its share of the expenses of the
Commission.
The legality of the financial and police-power aspects of the Compact
was challenged in State ex rel. Sims v. Dyer, 58 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1950),
as contravening the West Virginia Constitution. Pursuant to the Compact
the state legislature made its first appropriation of funds so that the Com-
7. Article VI of the Compact provides: "All sewage from municipalities or other
political subdivision, public or private institutions, or corporations, discharged or per-
mitted to flow into . . . the Ohio River and its tributary waters . . . shall be so
treated . . . as to provide for substantially complete removal of settleable solids, and the
removal of not less than forty-five percent (45%) of the total suspended solids . . .
[but] such higher degree of treatment shall be used as may be determined to be necessary
by the Commission after investigation, due notice and hearing. . . . The Commission
is hereby authorized to adopt, ptescribe and promulgate rules, regulations and standards
for enforcing the provision of this article. The Commission may from time to time, after
investigation and after a hearing, issue an order or orders upon any municipality, corpora-
tion, person or other entity discharging sewage or industrial waste into the Ohio River
or any other river . . . which constitutes any part of the boundary line between any two
or more of the signatory States, or into any stream any part of which flows from any
portion of one signatory State through any portion of another signatory State ...
The Commission shall give reasonable notice of the time and place of the hearing to
the . . . entity . . . against which such order is proposed." Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Compact, 54 STAT. 752 (1936).
8. "It shall be the duty of the municipality, corporation, person or other entity to
comply with any such order issued against it or him by the Commission, and any court
of general jurisdiction or any United States district court in any of the signatory States
shall have the jurisdiction, by mandamus, injunction, specific performance or other form
of remedy, to enforce any such order against any municipality, corporation or other
entity domiciled or located within such State or whose discharge of waste takes place
within or adjoining such State, or against any employee, department or subdivision of
such municipality, corporation, person or other entity; provided, however, such court
may review the order and affirm, reverse or modify the same upon any of the grounds
customarily applicable in proceedings for court review of administrative decisions. The
Commission or, at its request, the Attorney General or other law enforcing official, shall
have power to institute in such court any action for the enforcement of such order."
The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Art. IX, 54 STAT. 752 (1936).
9. "No . . . order shall go into effect unless and until it receives the assent of at
least a majority of the commissioners from each of not less than a majority of the
signatory States; and no . . . order upon a municipality, corporation, person or entity
in any State shall go into effect unless and until it receives the assent of not less than a
majority of the commissioners from such State." Ibid. The Compact makes no provision
for action against a state in case of pollution offenses.
10. "The Commission shall submit to the Governor of each State, at such time as he
may request, a budget of its estimated expenditures for such period as may be required
by the laws of such state for presentation to the legislature thereof." Id. at Art. V.
"The signatory States agree to appropriate for the salaries, office and other administra-
tive expefises, their proper proportion of the annual budget as determined by the Com-
mission and approved by the Governors of the signatory States in proportion to their
population within the District at the last preceeding federal census, the other half to be
prorated in proportion to their land area within the District." . ,Id. at Art. X. -
NOTES
mission could make a study of water-purification methods.'" The state auditor
refused to sign the warrant, and the commissioners from West Virginia sought
a writ of mandamus against him in the state supreme court,
The West Virginia Supreme Court refused the writ on the ground that
by ratifying the Compact the legislature attempted to incur an unconstitutional
debt 12 and to make improper delegations of the police power-a delegation
binding future legislatures and an extraterritorial delegation to foreign
commissioners. 3
This decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.'4 In
the majority opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter, holding that there was no
improper delegation of police power, stated:
What is involved is [a] conventional grant of legislative power.
. . . [T]his court [could] enter a decree requiring West Virginia
to abate pollution of interstate streams . . . [and the] legislature
would have no part in determining the State's obligation..
Nothing in its Constitution suggests that . . .West Virginia must
wait for the answer to be dictated by this court after harrassing and
unsatisfactory litigation. 5
In regard to the debt problem, the Court held that the obligation of the state
under the Compact was not 'n conflict with the state constitution.
The compact clause of the United States Constitution, which provides
that states shall not enter into compacts without the consent of Congress,"°
is a limitation on the exercise of state power rather than a grant of power to
the states. Since the totality of a state's power is derived from its own
sovereignty, Congress cannot grant a state the power to act in contravention
of the state constitution.' 7  Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court rejected
11. W. VA. Acrs 1949, c. 9, § 93.
12. "No debt shall be contracted by this State, except to meet casual deficits in the
revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion
or defend the State in time of war. . . ." W. VA. CONST. Art X, § 4.
13. The auditor argued that the "Legislature was without power to delegate to per-
sons and agencies, outside the State, and beyond the control of the Legislature, the police
powers of the State." State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 58 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1950). As to the
state debt limitation, he argued that the Compact purported to be a binding contract be-
tween the signatory states and the United States and could, therefore, be enforced against
the state by one of the other states. In such event, he contended, the obligation to pay
would exist for the life of the Compact and would be an unconstitutional debt.
14. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4195 (April 10, 1951).
15. Id. at 4198.
16. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10. This Clause also provides that no state shall enter into
a treaty. Actually, there is no distinction between treaties, which are proscribed, and com-
pacts, which are allowed with the consent of Congress. "The considerations that led the
Supreme Court to leave to Congress the determination of what constitutes a republican
form of Government . ..are equally controlling in leaving to Congress to circumscribe
the area of agreement open to the States." Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause
of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 HARv. L. REV. 685 n. 35
(1925). -
17. Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U.S. 291 (1906) ; Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (U.S. 1838).
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the argument that a state could not limit its own power to make a compact
consented to by Congress."8  Mr. Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion,
reached a contrary conclusion on- the ground that federally approved compacts
transcend state law by reason of the supremacy clause."9 This idea has been
advanced in compact litigation on numerous occasions with varying results.
But the modern and best-reasoned view is that the consent of Congress, though
an "act of Congress" for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court, does not make the compact supreme over state law."
18. This argument was made by amici, the other signatory states. U.S.L. WEEK
4195 at 4196 (April 10, 1951).
19. Mr. Justice Reed disagreed with the Court's assertion of power to interpret the
West Virginia Constitution. He distinguished contract clause cases, in which the
Supreme Court decides whether there is, under state law, a contract and whether it is
impaired, from compact clause cases, in which execution, validity, and meaning of federally
approved compacts are all federal questions by virtue of the supremacy clause. State
law, in other words, is immaterial in compact cases. But no case has. gone this far.
Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1937), relied on by Mr. Justice Reed, does not
support his position. In that case a water company sought to enjoin state officers from
closing the company's headgate under the authority of a New Mexico-Colorado compact,
which provided for rotation between the states of the right to divert water from the La
Plata River, on the ground that such action would destroy the company's vested rights
under the Colorado constitution. The court upheld the state officers' act'ion under the
Compact but carefully avoided interpreting the state constitution. The basis of the
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, was that the federal common law of equitable
apportionment of interstate water prevented Colorado, and the company, from taking
more than an equitable share of water in the first place. The Court did not decide that
congressional approval of the Compact invoked the supremacy clause.
20. The supremacy clause argument, ibid., advanced by Mr. Justice Reed, is related
to the idea that compacts are "acts of Congress" by virtue of the congressional consent.
The latter concept has frequently been advanced as grounds for Supreme Court juris-
diction.
One line of cases holds that the consent of Congress makes every compact an act
of Congress. See Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (U.S. 1851):
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823) ; accord, Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906). Another line of authority holds that consent does not make a compact an act
of Congress. See Hamburg-American Steamship Co. v. Brube, 196 U.S. 407 (1905) and
New York v. Central R.R., 12 Wall. 455 (U.S. 1872), where the Court said ". . . the
question arose under the compact and not under any Act of Congress. The assent of
Congress did not make the Act giving it a statute within the meaning of the . . .
Judiciary Act." 1 STAT. 85 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1949).
It should be apparent that compacts are not "acts of Congress." They are agreements
between states. Most compacts are not federal statutes in content, form, or administration.
In many instances a federal statute in the field would be unconstitutional, e.g., an adjust-
ment of a state boundary. Note, Some Legal and Practical Problems of the Interstate
Compact, 45 YALE L.J. 324 (1935). The "act of Congress" theory is incompatible with
the concept that the consent is merely a limitation on state power, see Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1838), and with the rule that state constitutions are
limitations on the compacting power of the states.
Recent cases have rejected the "act of Congress" grounds for jurisdiction in favor
of the federal-question basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1949). See Hinderlider v. La Plata
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1937) and Delaware River Comm. v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 (1939).
This was the theory of jurisdiction used in the present case.
However, in some cases the "act of Congress" theory, with all of its implications,
might properly be used. For example, .if the dispute is between two states over which
of two interpretations, both proper under the respective state constitutions, should be
placed on the agreement, the supremacy clause might properly be invoked on the theory
NOTES
Whatever the ultimate decision on a state's power to restrict its authority
to compact and the authority of state courts to finally interpret state constitu-
tions,2 ' a state which violates a compact may violate the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution. And the final interpreter of state statutes and constitu-
tional provisions alleged to have prohibited a state from entering a binding
contract is the United States Supreme Court.22 .Under the supremacy clause
rationale the Court would hold state law immaterial.
A state may escape contract liability where its constitution or statutes give
prior notice of invalidity,2 3 but no such notice as to police power is contained
in the West Virginia Constitution. However, police power limitations of the
type considered here are not customarily contained in written constitutions.
It is inherent in state sovereignty that the legislature cannot divest itself of
the police power though it can make temporary grants or delegations.24 The
Supreme Court, speaking of this Compact, was correct in saying that a con-
ventional grant of legislative power was involved. No foreign commissioners
exercise final authority over any West Virginia pollutioi offense,2" and each
state has the power to remove its own commissioners.26
that Congress intended to consent only to a particular interpretation. See Lessee of
Marlott v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1837). And in some compacts there exists congressional
action more positive than mere consent. Such is the case with this compact, which
confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts and provides for the appointment of
commissioners by the Federal Government. Should either of these two elements of the
compact be the subject of litigation, the Court might be justified in invoking the suprem-
acy clause. But it should not be applicable where the issue is whether the state legislature
has power, under the state constitution, to ratify the compact. See note 19 supra.
21. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1929) ; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky,
154 U.S. 204 (1894) ; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823) ; Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 4 Gill. & J. 1 (Md. 1832).
22. Dodge v. Board cff Education, 320 U.S. 74 (1937); Larson v. South Dakota,
278 U.S. 429 (1929) ; Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907).
23. There can be no impairment at all unless there was a valid contract initially
under state law. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Alabama R.R. Comm'n., 155 Fed. 792
(C.C.M.D. Ala. 1907); East Jersey Water Co. v. Newark, 96 N.J. Eq. 231, 125
A. 578, aff'd., 98 N.J.Eq. 672, 130 A. 557 (1925). See also Indiana ex rel. Anderson
v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938), reversing State ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 214 Ind.
347, 5 N.E.2d 531 (1937) ; Solomons v. Graham, 15 Wall. 208 (U.S. 1872).
24. Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408 (1911); Griffith v. Connecticut,
218 U.S. 563 (1910) ; West Chicago Street Ry. v. People, 201 U.S. 506 (1906) ; Douglas
v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897) ; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1897); State v.
Meek, 112 Ia. 338, 84 N.W. 3 (1900) ; Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657 (1866).
25. ". . . no . . . order . . . shall go into effect unless and until it receives
the assent of not less than a majority of the Commissioners from the State in which
the offense is committed." Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Art. IX,
54 STAT. 752 (1936).
26. "[A]ny commissioner may be removed or suspended from office as provided
by the law of the State from which he shall be appointed." Id. at Art. III. The
West Virginia commissioners "may be removed from office by the governor." W. VA.
Acts 1939, c. 38, § 2. Since no action can be taken against an offender in any state with-
out the approval of two of the three commissioners from the state, see note 9 supra,
apparently no action could be taken in that state if the state failed to appoint com-
missioners.
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The only uncommon delegation of police power involved in this compact
is the grant of authority to commissioners from one state to deal with pollution
offenses committed in another. Since each state has a legitimate interest in
the acts committed in upstream states, the advisory power vested in those
officers is not unwarranted. State-appointed officers have long exercized
official duties elsewhere than within their own state.2 7  Compacts have occa-
sionally provided for such action.2" The power of states to compact in regard
to problems in other states is reaoily understood if it is recalled that the states
once had full treaty-making power, the exercise of which is now restricted
only by the compact clause. The power itself is limited by the state constitu-
tion, and the Supreme Court should continue to recognize this principle.
Article X of the West Virginia Constitution plainly states that only
certain classes of debts may be created. The state courts have construed this
article rather strictly.2 But, assuming that the debt limitation does reach
the compacting power, the provision would cover any debts possibly imposed
by this Compact. Either the Compact exacts future appropriations or it does
not. If it does not, the Compact is not a binding contract. If it does, a default
by the legislature would be grounds for a judgment against the state and
would subject the state's property to execution. A judgment could be entered
against the state even though the amount of the debt is presently uncertain. 30
27. Recall the extraterritorial aspects of extradition. But there, as with this compact,
the laws of a state are not given extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Von Walden v. Geddes,
105 Conn. 374, 135 A. 396 (1926).
28. New England Interstate Water Pollution Compact, 61 STAT. 682 (1947); Port
of New York Authority Compact, 42 STAT. 174 (1921) ; Virginia Compact, 1 STAT. 189(1791) (providing for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction on the Ohio River by
Kentucky and other states). See Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 (1904).
29. Revenue bonds do not create debts within the constitutional inhibition. Bates v.
State Bridge Commission, 109 W.Va. 186, 153 S.E. 305 (1930). When the legislature
has determined that a casual deficit exists within the meaning of the constitution, the
courts will not disturb that action unless it is evident that contingencies did not exist to
support the ascertainment. Dickinson v. Talbott, 114 W. Va. 1, 170 S.E. 425 (1933);
Barry v. Fox, 114 W. Va. 513, 172 S.E. 896 (1934). If there is any doubt in the mind
of the court as to the constitutionality, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the act.
Bates v. State Bridge Commission, supra; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875).
30. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). When West Virginia became
a separate state an agreement was entered into between that state (WEST VA. CONST.
Art VIII, § 8) and the "Restored State of Virginia" (VA. Aces (Wheeling) 1861-1862,
16, 19) whereby West Virginia promised to pay its "equitable portion" of the then exist-
ing debts of Virginia. Congressional consent was given in the act admitting West Vir-
ginia to the Union. 12 STAT. 633 (1862). The Supreme Court held that the obligation
could be enforced and suggested several remedies for enforcement: 1. Mandamus against
the legislature after judgment in the Supreme Court. 2. Collection of a tax levied by the
United States Supreme Court. 3. Other appropriate "equitable" remedies by "dealing"
with the funds or taxable property of West Virginia. However, the Court decided to
wait until Congress had a chance to act in the matter. Before either the Court or
Congress acted, West Virginia paid its share. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact
Clause of the Contitutio--A Study in. Interstate Adjustments, App. A, 34 YALE L.J.
685, 738 (1925). The Court has repeatedly stated that it has the power to enter moneyjudgments against states, but execution has never been carried out. See South Dakota v.
NOTES
But the theory of recovery would be that the state was indebted, and such in-
debtedness is prohibited by the West Virginia Constitution.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter found no conflict between the Compact and the
debt provision of the state constitution. In support of this position he cited
Articles X and V of the Compact. Article X states that the annual budget
must be approved by the governors. If a governor's approval constitutes ac-
ceptance of fixed liability, the doctrine of separation of powers is violated in
that the legislative function is purely ministerial.3' However, if his approval
is merely a step in the state budget-and-appropriation procedure, it does not
differ from his approval of a strictly local budget recommendation and is
constitutional because final discretion remains in the legislature.32
Article V of the Compact states: "The Commission shall not incur any
obligation of any kind prior to the making of appropriations adequate to meet
the same; nor shall the Commission pledge the credit of any of the signatory
states, except by and with the authority of the legislature thereof." This
article puts it beyond the power of the Commission to bind the states by be-
coming indebted to third parties. But it has no relevancy in regard to any
liability of the states to the Commission; and it is that liability which the state
auditor questioned. His premise was that the compact-ratification statute
created a debt and that the appropriation was made to pay it. Actually the
appropriation was made to finance a present operation of the police power. 33
So long as the legislatures continue to favor the Compact by making re-
quested appropriations, the Commission will operate smoothly. But if some
of the states become dissatisfied, it will not be difficult for them to destroy
the effectiveness of the Compact. Refusal to appropriate funds will be only
one of the devices employed. The veto power of the commissioners from
North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1903) ; United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379 (1903);
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890) ; Crisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419(U.S. 1792); Note, 31 HARV. L. REv. 1158 (1918).
31. "The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments shall be separate and
distinct so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the
others . . ." WAEsr VA. CoNsT., Art. V, § 1. This article forbids the exercise of legisla-
tive powers by the governor. State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 14 S.E. 407 (1892). "No
money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law . . ." WEST VA. CONST. Art. 10, § 3. Making appropriations is a legislative function.
See Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, 631 (1875).
32. WEST VA. CoNsT. Art. 6, § 51, provides for substantially the same budget pro-
cedure as does the compact.
33. "Ordinarily, the creation of a State board or commission which requires an ap-
propriation of public funds to carry out its purposes is not treated as the creation of a
debt, although its generally contemplated continuation from year to year and for an
indefinite period must necessarily involve future appropriations." State ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 58 S.E.2d 766, 773 (W. Va. 1950). The expenditure in this case "does not call for
any further appropriation by the present or any future Legislature. Such further appro-
priations may become advisable, but that is a question that the future alone must deter-
mine." State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, supra, at 779 (dissenting opinion).
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each state could be just as devastating. Thus, any apparent binding effect
of the Compact is illusory.
The Compact should be viewed as a statement of policy 3' which the sig-
natory states, in their own interest, are not likely to abandon. The primary
legal effect of each state's formal ratification of the Compact is to give the
Commission power to act within that state and to make it a duly constituted
arm of the state government.
Until the twentieth century, compacts were not expressions of a desire
for regional control., All of them dealt with boundary controversies and simi-
lar matters beyond the constitutional power of the national government to
manage.3 ' Now, with the prospect of federal control resulting from lack of
interstate cooperation, the states are willing to follow the policy of Congress
by utilizing compacts as a device to enable regions larger than single states to
solve their local problems without interference from the distant majority."8
The fate of the movement depends upon the Supreme Court. The Court can
end states' willingness to compact by holding them rigidly bound when they
intend, as in this case, only loose association. At the other extreme, the Court
can allow easy escape on questionable state constitutional grounds that would
be invalid in a strictly domestic case. Either course will destroy the compact
trend; the moderation exhibited by the Supreme Court in this case will pro-
mote it.
34. Illustrative of the fact that the Compact is intended as a statement of policy
is Compact Article I, which provides that each state "agrees to enact any necessary
legislation to enable each such State to place and maintain the waters . . . in a satis-
factory sanitary condition . . ." The veto power of the commissioners from each state
should dispell any doubt that the Compact is something more than a policy statement.
35. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study In
Interstate Adjustments, App. A, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 738 (1925).
36 "To the advocates of decentralization [compacts] are a kind of intermediate ar-
rangement which avoids the centralization tendencies of federal regulation, whereas the
advocates of centralization consider compacts a basis for possible evolution of control
from the state to the region and then from the region to the nation. It has even been
suggested that if the potentialities of the compact continue to be developed 'it may result
in a finer balance of power between the states and the nation'." Clark, Interstate Compacts
and Social Legislation, 50 POL. Sci. Q. 502, 503 (1935).
